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ORGANIZING A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO ACHIEVE
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES IN INDIANA
CYM H. LOWELLI
As interest in real estate investment has become more widespreaa
among investors, considerable attention has been directed toward the or-
ganizational vehicles available to implement their investment objectives.
Where the prospective investment group is small, the limited partnership
has become the most commonly utilized organizational form. The primary
reason for this choice has been that the limited partnership provides the
most favorable tax treatment, while avoiding many of the drawbacks in-
cident to the use of other organizational forms.
The favorable tax treatment results basically from the fact that the
limited partnership allows investors to realize relatively diverse invest-
ment objectives, such as the realization of current income or the creation
of a tax shelter. Current income, of course, is realized when the current
operating revenues of the venture exceed the current costs of its operation.
A tax shelter is created, on the other hand, when the deductible items
flowing from the investment-primarily depreciation and interest ex-
pense-exceed its cash flow. This excess "shelters" other income of the
investor because it is deductible from his gross income. The investor in
this way avoids present taxation at his current tax rate, which will be a
significant advantage to the high bracket taxpayer. When the investment
is eventually sold, moreover, the proceeds will be realized at capital gains
rates. Thus, to the extent that the gain is not recaptured, the investor will
have converted dollars taxable currently at ordinary income rates into
dollars taxable in the future at capital gains rates.'
Though the limited partnership is a commonly utilized organizational
form for real estate investment, it does pose many problems from a plan-
ning point of view. In order to clarify some of these problems, and to
point out solutions where they are needed, this article shall review the
considerations that will lead a relatively small group of investors seeking
these two objectives to select the limited partnership as an organizational
t Associate: Dutton, Kappes & Overman, Indianapolis. Member of the Indian-
apolis Bar.
1. See Berger & Kanter, Incorporation of Real Estate Syndicates is Creating Un-
itsual Investment Vehicle, 16 J. TAX. 224 (1962). See generally Aronsohn, Tax Plan-
ning for Acquisitions and Operation of Investment Real Estate by Groups of Investors,
TULAXE 18TH ANNUAL TAX INST. 572, 578-81 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Aronsobn] ;
McKee, The Real Estate Tax Shelter: A Computerized Expose, 57 VA. L. REv. 521
(1971).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
form, 2 and then consider the various problems consequent upon its or-
ganization.
FORMS OF ORGANIZATION FOR REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
As is true in any type of business enterprise, there are several organi-
zational forms available to facilitate real estate investment. A prerequisite
to a choice among them, however, is the recitation of the function that
must be served by any real estate investment vehicle. As minimal require-
ments, any form of organization must perform at least four functions for
its investors. First, it must permit the borrowing of significant amounts
of capital. Since one of the chief advantages of real estate investment is
the financial leverage which may be obtained by the use of borrowed funds,
a structure which limits borrowing ability will not be desirable. Second,
the organizational form must provide the investors with limited liability
-limited, that is, to their investment. This is especially important in a
real estate project requiring substantial debt financing. Third, since a
principal benefit of real estate investment comes from the tax benefits
that it may produce, the vehicle must allow those benefits to pass through
to the investor without being first taxed, or taken, at the entity level.
Finally, the investors will want to avoid, as much as possible, administra-
tive reporting and disclosure requirements at both the federal and state
level.8
With these criteria in mind, attention may be directed toward a rela-
tively brief analysis of each of the available forms of organization.
2. Before choosing a form of organization, the alert planner should review the
relevant provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which have made real estate invest-
ment somewhat less attractive for many types of investors. These provisions include
those relating to the permissible methods of depreciation, INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 167;
the extent of depreciation recapture, id. §§ 1245 & 1250; the new tax preference items,
id. §§ 56-58 (primarily those for accelerated depreciation of real property, id. § 57(a) (2),
for capital gains, id. § 57(a) (9), and for excess investment interest, id. § 57(a) (1));
the limitation on the investment interest deduction, id. § 163(d); and the maximum
earned income tax, id. § 1348. See generally Doyle, Effect of 1969 Tax Reform Act on
Future Real Estate Tax Shelter Transactions, 34 J. TAx. 102 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Doyle]; Gould, Trends it Tax Planning for Real Estate Investments, 50 TAXES 732
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gould] ; Katcher, Tax-Sheltered Investments in Real Estate
Under the 1969 Tax Reform Act, 23 U. So. CAL. 1970 TAx INsT. 587; Ritter & Sunley,
Real Estate and Tax Reform: An Analysis and Evaluation of the Real Estate Provi-
sions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 30 MD. L. REv. 5 (1970).
These provisions provide both tax traps and tax advantages, so that the alert plan-
ner will need to analyze his clients' particular circumstances with considerable detail
before choosing an organizational form, or, in fact, before recommending real estate
investment as a means of accomplishing their investment objectives.
3. These four functions are considered in Sonfield, The Texas Limited Partnership
as a Vehicle for Real Estate Investment, 3 ST. MARv's L.J. 13 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Sonfield].
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Subchapter C Corporation
The first form of organization that should be considered, is the
normal Subchapter C corporation 4 -that is, the ordinary corporate form
-whose use as a means of holding investment property is a common prac-
tice. Its basic advantages are those that are inherent in the corporate form
of organization: limited liability, centralized management, continuity of
life and free transferability of interest.' There are, in addition, the ad-
vantages of avoiding the consequences of the death of an individual who
holds real property, such as estate and inheritance taxes, and the ability to
borrow at rates that would be considered usurious if charged to individuals
or unincorporated entities.6
The disadvantages which stem from use of the Subchapter C cor-
poration, however, are significant. As a separate taxable entity, its use
precludes the pass-through of tax shelter benefits to individual share-
holders, which will frustrate one of the primary investment objectives of
most investors." It also raises a wide range of limitations imposed by
the Internal Revenue Code.' Primary among these are the personal
holding company,' collapsible corporation,"0 and unreasonable accumula-
4. The "Subchapter C" designation is used because the corporate tax rules are con-
tained in §§ 301-395 of the Internal Revenue Code, which collectively comprise Sub-
chapter C of the Code.
5. Aronsohn, supra note 1, at 584-86.
6. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4(a) (Snith-Hurd 1966). The restrictions
posed by usury laws may be responsible for the use of the "straw corporation" as a
means of holding title to real property. See Morris, New Developments in Packaging
thc Real Estate Venture for Private Investors, TULANE 20TH ANNUAL TAX INST. 147,
150-51 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
7. Aronsohn, Kurtz & Kronovet, Advantages and Disadvantages of Various Ways
of Holding Real Estate; Partnerships, Subchapter S Corporations, Real Estate Ievest-
ment Trusts, Real Estate Straws: A Panel, N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 145, 148
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Advantages and Disadvantages].
8. Though there are many disadvantages, there are also a few tax advantages.
Probably the most important of these is that no gain or loss is recognized to either the
transferor or the corporation if property is transferred to the corporation by one or
more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities, and such persons immediately
thereafter control eighty per cent of the corporation's voting stock. INT. REV. CODE Of
1954, §§ 351(a), 358(a), 362(a). This need not be a factor in choosing between the
corporation and the partnership, however, since § 721 of the Code provides for non-
recognition in the case of property contributed in return for an interest in the partner-
ship. Id. § 721.
9. The Code provides that a corporation may be a personal holding company if
five or fewer shareholders own more than fifty per cent of its stock, and at least sixty
per cent of its adjusted ordinary gross income is "personal holding company income."
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 542(a). Basically, "personal holding company income" is
passive income such as dividends, interest, royalties, and, in some cases, rent and per-
sonal service income. Id. § 543. If a corporation is deemed a personal holding com-
pany, it will be subject to a seventy per cent tax on all undistributed income in addition
to its ordinary corporate tax and surtax. Id. § 541. See generally B. BiTTKER & J.
EuSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOMIE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS Il I 8.20-.25
(3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BiTT=xz & EuSTICE] ; Greenberg, Forms of Organi-
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tion of income rules." In addition, many states have enacted special
franchise taxes which tax the privilege of a corporation to do business
in that state, 2 and others have adopted a tax upon the amount of out-
standing corporate indebtedness," all of which simply add further dis-
advantage to the corporate form of organization.' 4
Thus, although the Subchapter C corporation has many non-tax
advantages, it is generally unsuited for use as a means of real estate in-
vestment because of its severe tax disadvantages. 5
Subchapter S Corporation
A second potential form of organization is the Subchapter S corpora-
tion,'6 which, if qualified, may elect to have its income taxed directly to
the shareholders without tax at the corporate level.' In addition, most
zation for Holding and Developing Real Estate, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1129,
1135 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Greenberg] ; Loening, Personal Holding Companies:
Re-Viewing an Old Problem; New Implications, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 815
(1971).
10. Although the collapsible corporation rules in § 341 are quite complex, their
basic principle is that gain realized by a shareholder in a transaction that would nor-
mally produce capital gain will be considered the sale of a non-capital asset if the cor-
poration was formed with a view to effecting such sale before the corporation had
realized a substantial part of the income to be derived from its activities. INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 341. See generally BiTTxrR & EusTcE, supra note 9, IT I 12.01-.09; Greenberg,
supra note 9, at 1136.
11. To prevent shareholders from allowing the corporation to accumulate all its
income, which they may later "bailout" at capital gain rates, the Code provides that any
corporation formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding income tax to its share-
holders by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or
distributed shall be subject to a special accumulated earnings tax. INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 532. The accumulation of earnings and profits "beyond the reasonable needs of
the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax" to share-
holders. Id. § 533(a). Although accumulations for amortization of mortgage indebted-
ness, capital improvements and future real estate investments may qualify as reasonable
needs of the business, the fact that a corporation is "a mere . . . investment company"
is prima facie evidence of a purpose to avoid income taxation. Id. § 533(b). If the
requisite tax avoidance purpose exists, the corporation is taxed at a rate of 271/2 per
cent on its "accumulated taxable income" not in-excess of 100,000 dollars, and 38% per
cent on its "accumulated taxable income" in excess of 100,000 dollars. Id. § 531. "Ac-
cumulated taxable income" is defined in § 535. See generally BIrTrER & EuSTICE,
supra note 9, 1 8.09.
12. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAw § 209 (McKinney 1966).
13. See, e.g., TEx. TAx-GEN. art. 12.01 (1969).
14. Although Indiana does have a corporation fee act, IND. CODE § 23-3-2-2 (1971),
IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-602 (1972), the taxes it requires are no more than nominal pay-
ments and will hardly deter the use of the corporate form.
15. See Hall, Use of Limited Partnership to Invest in Depreciable Realty, 21 MER-
CER L. REv. 481, 490 (1970).
16. This designation arises from the special rules in §§ 1371-78 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which collectively comprise Subchapter S of the Code.
17. To be eligible for the election, the corporation must be a "small business cor-
poration," as defined by § 1371 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, to be eligible
a corporation must not (1) be a member of an affiliated group as defined in § 1504,
(2) have more than 10 shareholders, (3) have a shareholder (other than an estate)
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tax benefits will pass through to shareholders with the same characteriza-
tion that they would have had at the corporate level."8 The Subchapter S
corporation, therefore, provides the ordinary corporate benefits of limited
liability, while allowing a favorable pass-through of financial results, all
of which make it an attractive vehicle for real estate investment.
The major obstacle to the use of Subchapter S is the rule, designed
to limit its use to corporations having substantial "operating" as opposed
to "investment" income, 9 that an election shall terminate automatically
if the corporation has "passive investment income" in excess of twenty per
cent of its gross receipts for any taxable year." Passive investment in-
come is in turn defined to include "rents,"'" which are "amounts received
for the use of, or right to use, property (whether real or personal) of the
corporation."22 Although most forms of rental income will thus bear the
taint of passive investment income, the regulations do provide that the
taint may be avoided in the case of the rental of rooms or space if the cor-
poration provides "significant services" to its renters.2" To provide the
requisite significant services, the corporation will be required to render its
tenants services not usually or customarily rendered in the rental of similar
rooms or space.24 There is, unfortunately, relatively little authority in-
dicating when the "significant service" exception is satisfied, and that
which is available is not encouraging to those seeking Subchapter S treat-
ment."2
who is not an individual, (4) have a nonresident alien shareholder, or (5) have more
than one class of stock. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1371(a). See BITTKER & EUSTICE,
supra note 9, 1 6.02.
18. Thus, earnings and profits, whether or not they are distributed, INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 1373(a), and capital gains both retain their corporate character in the share-
holders' hands. Id. § 1375 (a) (1). It is to be noted, however, that gain on § 1231 prop-
erty loses its special identity at the shareholder level, where it is reported as a simple
long-term capital gain. See BITTRER & EusTIcE, supra note 9, f1 6.06. Although net
operating losses also pass through with the usual carryback and carryover of § 172, to
the extent of the shareholder's adjusted basis in his stock and any indebtedness of the
corporation to him, long-term capital losses do not. Id. T 6.07. Since earnings and
profits are computed at the corporate level, depreciation allowances are exhausted at the
corporate level, making them unavailable to shareholders as a means of offsetting other
personal income.
19. BIrrxER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, f1 6.03, at 6-13.
20. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1372(e) (5).
21. Id. § 1372(e) (5) (C). See also Bramlette Building Corp. v. Commissioner,
424 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1970).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (5) (vi) (1969).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. In Bramlette Building Corp. v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1970),
it was held that a corporation did not remove the taint from the rents it received from
rental of its office building, when it merely sought to attract other tenants who would
aid the existing tenants' businesses, and furnished porter, maid, and repair services.
These were not sufficiently "significant services" because they did not differ from
those furnished in similar office buildings. Similarly, in City Markets, Inc. v. Corn-
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Even if the passive income termination rule can be overcome, the
Subchapter S corporation is still somewhat less attractive than the part-
nership form because of the difference in deductibility of net operating
losses. In both the Subchapter S corporation and the partnership, a share-
holder or partner may deduct losses only to the extent of his basis." In
the case of the partnership, basis may include a pro rata share of partner-
ship liabilities 2 7-that is, mortgage indebtedness-but in the Subchapter
S corporation only indebtedness of the corporation to the stockholder may
be used to increase the basis." This distinction makes the Subchapter S
corporation even less attractive as a basic vehicle for real estate invest-
ment. 9
missioner, 433 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1970), the corporation operated a farmers market,
which rented space to produce vendors and other types of small business. Its provision
of garbage can spraying, occasional alteration of booths to suit tenants' needs, pest
control and like services were not so significant that its rental income was "rents." Al-
though the court did find that advertising in the yellow pages and the maintenance of a
billboard were not "usually and customarily rendered in connection with the rental of
commercial property," id. at 1242, these services did not alone possess the required sig-
nificance. See also Max Feingold, 49 T.C. 461 (1968) ; Alexander, Real Estate Syndi-
cation and the Effects of the Tax Reform Act of z969, 25 U. MIAmi L. REv. 197, 215-16
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Alexander].
Although they do not deal with "significant services" or the rental of "rooms or
space," several revenue rulings do shed some light on this problem. It has been ruled
that amounts received by an electing corporation from the short-term leasing of motor
vehicles are not "rents" where the corporation is required by the lease to furnish all
upkeep and maintenance functions. Rev. Rul. 65-40, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 429. See also
Rev. Rul. 65-83, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 430; Rev. Rul. 64-232, 1964-2 Cuir. BULL. 334. Simi-
larly, the lease of a farm under a share-farming agreement does not give rise to "rents"
where the corporation actively participates in the work and management of the farm.
Rev. Rul. 61-112, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 399. These rulings might be interpreted to mean
that "rents" are not received when the corporation is "actively" conducting business, and
not simply "passively" collecting rental income.
26. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 704(d), 1374(c) (2).
27. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). The loss deductibility rules are con-
sidered in length at notes 110-15 infra & text accompanying.
28. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1374(c) (2) (B).
29.- See Advantages and Disadvantages, supra note 7, at 153-54. See also Blum,
Tax Considerations in Financing Real Estate Transactions, 47 TAXE S 844, 846 (1969).
These problems with the Subchapter S corporation may be circumvented if the
theory of a recent Tax Court case is viable. In David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. No. 75
(1973), a corporation was formed to hold real estate "leaseback" properties and to ob-
tain financing to cover the full purchase price of such properties. In order to obtain
funds, the corporation would issue notes to a lending institution. As security for the
notes, the corporation would execute a mortgage and an assignment of its lease, and
would convey all of its interest in the property to a trustee under a deed of trust. The
corporation would then deed the property to its shareholders, who executed an assump-
tion agreement in favor of the financing institution involved and agreed to be bound by
the deed of trust and assignment. However, the shareholders did not assume any per-
sonal obligation for the payment of principal or interest on the notes, or for any mone-
tary judgment; their liability was limited to the property. When a shareholder sought
to claim depreciation on his property, the IRS denied the deduction. In upholding the
taxpayer, the Tax Court held that the shareholder had a depreciable interest in the
property, since he had acquired legal title and full beneficial interest from the corpora-
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Real Estate Investment Trust
The real estate investment trust (REIT) is a valuable means of
facilitating real property investment, but because of its relatively rigid
contours it is quite impractical for small groups of investors. To qualify,
the organization must, basically, be an unincorporated trust or associa-
tion," which would normally be taxable as a corporation,"' and which has
100 or more beneficial owners32 whose ownership must be evidenced by
transferable shares."3 The basic advantage of the REIT is that it is taxed
under a "conduit" principle, similar to that applied to regulated invest-
ment companies,3 so that its distributed income is taxed only to the dis-
tributees, 3 and capital gains distributions may retain their character in
the distributees' hands.3 Thus, the REIT has several advantages for
many groups and purposes, but it is not available as a real estate invest-
ment device to groups of less than 100."r
tion. More significantly, however, the court allowed the shareholder to include the
unpaid balance of the mortgage in his basis fcr depreciation purposes, although he was
not personally liable on the notes secured in part by the mortgage.
By this scheme, then, the taxpayer was able to use the corporation to achieve lim-
ited liability, to acquire full non-recourse financing, and to avoid usury law restrictions.
In addition, he achieved a viable tax shelter. In effect, the taxpayer obtained one of
the primary benefits of the Subchapter S corporation (i.e., pass-through of deprecia-
tion deductions). This benefit was obtained despite the fact that it would have been
unavailable if the corporation had received the rental income since in that case the
income would almost certainly have been considered passive investment income. See
notes 19-25 supra & text accompanying. In addition, the taxpayer received the added
benefit, not available to shareholders of Subchapter S corporations, of being able to use
the corporation's mortgage indebtedness to increase his basis for deduction purposes.
See notes 27-28 supra & text accompanying.
Bolger poses a scheme of great potential interest to investors. However, since it
also poses, in the words of Judge Tannenwald, "a bitter pill for [the Commissioner] to
swallow," it is almost certain that the IRS will continue to attack this type of scheme.
Indeed, such attack is given some force by the dissents of Judges Scott, Quealy, Goffe
and Wiles in Bolger, who would employ the "step transaction" doctrine to preclude suc-
cessful implementation of the plan.
30. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 856(a).
31. Id. § 856(a) (3).
32. Id. § 856(a) (5).
33. Id. § 856(a) (2). There are also several other limitations, which are listed in
§ 856(c) of the Code. See generally Aldrich, Real Estate Investment Trusts: An Over-
view, 27 Bus. LAw. 1165 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Aldrich] ; Epstein, State Securities
Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 514 (1971) ; Sobieski,
State Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 48 VA. L. Rlv. 1069
(1962) ; Comment, The Real Estate Investment Trust-Arkansas Considerations, 24
ARK. L. REv. 453 (1971).
34. See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 851-55.
35. This treatment will apply, however, only if the REIT distributes ninety per
cent of its "real estate investment trust taxable income" (defined in ,TNT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 857(b) (1)), and complies with other requirements of the Code and regulations.
Id. §§ 857 (a) (1), (2). See Aldrich, supra note 33.
36. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 857(b) (3) (B).
37. Greenberg, supra note 9, at 1146.
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Illinois Land Trust
The so-called Illinois Land Trust is a means of facilitating the hold-
ing and conveyancing of real property that is available in many states.
Basically, it is an arrangement under which legal and equitable title is
transferred to a trustee-usually a corporate fiduciary-while the bene-
ficiaries, whose interest is personalty, retain the exclusive power to direct
and control the trustee, to manage the property and to receive its earnings
and proceeds. 8 It has the virtue of avoiding dower claims and estate and
inheritance tax liens,39 as well as allowing the beneficiaries to remain
anonymous.4" In addition, since the trust is not generally regarded as a
separate taxable entity,"1 there will be no effect upon the tax treatment of
the beneficiaries.,"
Thus, the Illinois Land Trust poses several organizational advant-
ages, and is clearly permissible in Indiana." For small groups of inves-
tors, however, the flexibility and familiarity of the limited partnership
will make it the preferable organizational vehicle.
General Partnership
Traditionally, partnerships were unattractive means of holding real
property because title was required to be held in the names of all the part-
ners individually. With the removal of that hindrance," the partnership
form has become a popular means of holding real estate. Its attraction
stems primarily from the significant tax advantages that it provides its
partners. Under the partnership tax rules, each partner is taxed in full
for his distributive share of all items of income, gain, loss, deduction or
credit.4" The distributive share of each partner may, in turn, be fixed by
38. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 29, § 8.31 (Smith-Hurd 1972). See generally G. Bo-
GERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 250 (2d ed. 1964) ; Doyle, mtpra note 2.
39. Greenberg, supra note 9, at 1154-55.
40. Id. at 1155. This virtue, however, has been recently removed in Illinois.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 29, § 8.32 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
41. Rev. Rul. 63-16, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 350. But cf. Del Mar Addition v. Com-
missioner, 113 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1940).
42. The trust is required only to file a separate notice of fiduciary relationship.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6903.
43. See IND. CODE § 30-4-2-13 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1413 (Supp. 1972)
(bars application of the Statute of Uses to defeat the trustee's equitable title). Earlier
doubts as to its legality in Indiana were expressed in Note, Illinois Land Trusts in Indi-
ana, 3 VAL. L. REv. 298 (1969).
44. The Uniform Partnership Act provides that the partnership may hold and
convey real property in its own name, and that the partners' interest in the partnership
is considered personalty. UNIFORM PARTNERSHip AcT §§ 8, 10, 26. These provisions
have been adopted in Indiana. IND. CODE §§ 23-4-1-8, 23-4-1-10, 23-4-1-26 (1971), IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 50-408, 50-410, 50-426 (1964).
45. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 701, 702.
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the partnership agreement,46 so long as the allocation is not principally
for the purpose of tax avoidance or evasion, and has a business purpose
or substantial economic effect.47 This flexibility, of course, sharply dif-
ferentiates the partnership from the Subchapter S corporation, where each
shareholder must report his pro rata share of the net income without any
ability to specially allocate particular items.48 In addition, use of the
partnership form avoids the corporate tax hazards of the personal holding
company and accumulated earnings rules, and the impact of the "collapsi-
bility" rules is much less stringent."
Although these tax advantages may be attractive, the general part-
nership is not really suitable for real estate investment for several major
reasons. First, the partnership itself lacks any real continuity, since death,
withdrawal or bankruptcy will cause dissolution. " Second, a partner-
ship, like an individual, but unlike a corporation, is subject to applicable
usury laws,"' and is thus effectively precluded from borrowing the capital
necessary for successful real estate investment. The chief drawback, how-
ever, is that the general partnership form subjects its partners to unlimited
liability for all debts and obligations of the partnership.52 Thus, the
general partnership would not provide the requisites of limited liability
and facilitation of borrowing, though it would provide a pass-through
of tax benefits.
Limited Partnership
The limited partnership is the half-way house between the partner-
ship and corporation, enjoying most of their advantages, while avoiding
most of their drawbacks.5" This results from its basically two-class struc-
46. Id. § 704.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2) (1964).
48. The Code provides that each shareholder in a Subchapter S corporation "shall
include in his gross income . . . , the amount he would have received as a dividend, if
on such last day there had been distributed pro rata . . . an amount equal to the cor-
poration's undistributed taxable income. . . ." INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1373(b). A
similar rule is provided for net operating losses. Id. § 1374(c) (1). See generally BiTT-
KER & EUSTIcE, supra note 9, ff 6.05.
49. Section 751 of the Code defends against the use of a "collapsible" partnership.
See A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION §§ 20.17-.18 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WIL-
LIS].
50. IND. CODE § 23-4-1-31 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-431 (1964).
51. See note 6 supra.
52. IND. CoDE § 23-4-1-15 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-415 (1964). It is to be
noted that the joint venture is simply a general partnership organized for a specific pur-
pose, and is also a possible vehicle for real estate investment. See Aronsohn, The Real
Estate Limited Partnership and Other Joint Ventures, 1 REAL EST. REv. 43 (1971);
Sonfield, supra note 3, at 16.
53. See Aronsohn, supra note 1, at 586-89. The early history of the limited part-
nership in Indiana is discussed in Brown, The Limited Partnership in Indiana, 5 IND. I.J.
421 (1930).
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ture where limited partners have a status essentially resembling that of
a corporate shareholder, while general partners retain the characteristics
of a partner in a general partnership. The limited partnership resembles
the general partnership to the extent that death, bankruptcy or incom-
petency does not affect the partnership's real property, since the partner-
ship interest is personalty, 4 and because death of a general partner will
ordinarily cause dissolution.5 It tends to resemble a corporation in that
(1) the partnership agreement may provide for continuity if the business
is continued by the remaining partners after an act of dissolution;5" (2)
death of a limited partner has no effect upon the continuation of the busi-
ness ;"7 and (3) use of a corporate general partner will permit avoidance
of the limitations imposed by applicable usury laws.5" Despite this two-
class structure, the limited partnership is taxed as a partnership, so that
it retains the significant tax advantages of the partnership rules.
The limited partnership, if it has a qualifying corporate general part-
ner, thus, meets all of the essential criteria for the choice of an organiza-
tional vehicle. It will protect the limited partners with limited liability, it
will allow the necessary acquistion of capital, and it will both provide the
requisite pass-through of tax benefits and allow great flexibility in their
allocation. For these reasons, and because of the drawbacks of the other
forms, the limited partnership has been the common choice for relatively
small groups of investors where no business consideration requires the
utilization of a corporation."
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Having now seen why the limited partnership is the most popular
of the organizational vehicles for real estate investment, attention should
now be directed toward the kinds of problems that are encountered in its
organization.
Avoidance of "Association" Status
The first problem likely to be encountered is how to properly organ-
ize the limited partnership to ensure that it will qualify for the favorable
federal income tax rules afforded to partnerships. This is a problem area
because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has, in a detailed set of
54. IND. CODE § 23-4-2-18 (1971), IN,. ANN. STAT. § 50-138 (1964).
55. Ir. CoDE § 23-4-2-20 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-140 (1964).
56. Id.
57. IND. CoDE § 23-4-2-21 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-141 (1964).
58. See note 6 supra.
59. See Aronsohn, supra note 1, at 586; Miller, Real Estate Syndication Under the
California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 371, 388 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Miller] ; Morris, supra note 6, at 152.
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regulations," set up several guidelines to ascertain when a partnership
-will be taxed as a partnership and when as an association-that is, as a
Subchapter C corporation. Basically, this involves an analysis of the
presence or absence in a partnership of the characteristics of a 'pure"
corporation: (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on business, (3)
continuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) limited liability
and (6) free transferability of interest.6 If such analysis shows that the
entity more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership, (i.e., it
has more corporate than noncorporate characteristics,62 omitting (1) and
(2) because they are common to both63), it will be so treated for tax
purposes."
Inasmuch as associational status is to be avoided at all costs, it is
imperative that the partnership agreement be drafted in such a way as to
steer clear of the associational taint. This is not unduly difficult if the
guidelines in the regulations are carefully kept in mind.
(1) Continuity of Life
According to the applicable Treasury Regulations, an organization is
said to have continuity of life "if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retire-
ment, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a dissolu-
tion . ... ," This characteristic, however, poses little difficulty to the
limited partnership, since the regulations themselves provide that if it
complies with a statute comparable to the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act it lacks continuity of life. 6 That concession is made, presumably,
because such a statute provides for dissolution upon retirement, death or
insanity of a general partner absent authorization to continue the business
in the partnership agreement or unanimous partnership consent to do so.7
Thus, continuity of life may be avoided either by not providing for
continuity in the certificate, or by limiting the life of the partnership. In
order to avoid the continuity characteristic, while satisfying the business
objectives of the partners, the preferred approach will probably be to
60. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, 301.7701-2 (1965) ; Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3,
301.7701-4 (1960).
61. Id. § 301.7701-2 (a) (1). See also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935).
62. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1965). Thus, if a limited partnership has
centralized management and free transferability, but not limited liability and continuity
of life, i.e., there is no predominance of corporate over partnership characteristics, it
will be treated as a partnership for tax purposes. Id.
63. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1965).
64. Id. §§ 301.7701-2(a) (1), (b) (1).
65. Id. § 301.7701-2(b) (1).
66. Id. § 301.7701-2(b) (3).
67. See IND. CODE § 23-4-2-20 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-140 (1964).
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specify in the agreement that the death, insanity or retirement of either a
general or limited partner will dissolve the partnership, but that the part-
nership may be reformed to continue its business upon a proper vote of
the partnership. Such a provision is described as providing for 'contin-
gent continuity.""8
(2) Centralization of Management
As a general proposition, centralized management is said to exist
whenever there is a concentration of the exclusive authority to make in-
dependent business decisions-that is, those other than "ministerial deci-
sions"-without the ratification of other members of the organization."'
This rule clearly looks to the degree of management control present,
which would seem necessarily to cloak the limited partnership formea
under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act with centralized manage-
ment-inasmuch as the general partners are vested with the manage-
ment power,7 and limited partners are barred from taking part in manage-
ment upon risk of losing their limited liability. 1 The regulations go on,
however, to provide that centralized management exists in a limited part-
nership, formed under a statute similar to the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act, only if "substantially all the interests in the partnership are
owned by the limited partners." 2
68. Rev. Rul. 54-484, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 242; Glensder Textile Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 46 B.T.A. 176, 185 (1942) ; WILtis, supra note 49, § 1.05. This type of provision
was evidently contemplated by the regulations, which specifically note that "there may
be a dissolution . . . and no continuity of life although the business is continued by
the remaining members." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (2) (1965).
69. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (3) (1965).
70. UxiFoRm LI MITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9, which has been adopted in Indiana.
IND. CODE § 23-4-2-9 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-129 (1964).
71. UNIFORAt LIMITED PARTNERSHIp ACT § 7, which has been adopted in Indiana.
IND. CODE § 23-4-2-7 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-127 (1964). See generally Sonfield,
mipra note 3, at 19-20.
72. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1965), which also notes that limited partner-
ships "generally do not have centralized management." Id.
Thus, although the general rule looks to management concentration, the specific
limited partnership rule seems to look to proprietary control. This, of course, leaves
room for considerable dispute. Do the regulations, for example, require both manage-
ment and proprietary control, or one but not the other? The phraseology of the regu-
lation does indeed present some "inherent and illogical contradictions," Stein, Partnership
Taxation for the Limited Partnership with a Corporate General Partner-It Cat Be
Done, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 435, 444 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Stein], which are not
at all clarified by the examples provided. One example notes that centralized manage-
ment is present where three general partners contribute 300,000 dollars, thirty limited part-
ners contribute five million dollars and the general partners, with unanimous consent,
have exclusive management control; in this situation, the limited partners are said to
have a substantial interest. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (2) (example 1) (1960). An-
other example says that centralization also exists where three general partners con-
tribute 50,000 dollars, 900 limited partners contribute five million dollars, and the gen-
eral partners have exclusive management control; under these circumstances, centraliza-
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The centralization of management characteristic may, therefore, be
avoided by insuring that the general partner has a sizeable capital interest
in the limited partnership. 3 The difficulty, of course, is in ascertaining
when a general partner's share is sufficient to negate the totality of the
limited partners' ownership. This determination can be made only by analy-




tion exists because of management concentration and the limited partners' substantial in-
terest. Id. (example 2).
The apparent ambiguity of the regulations may be resolved in either of two ways.
First, it could be argued that the regulations were purposefully vague, so that the Com-
missioner would have a ground upon which to attack similar organizations in contra-
dictory manners-as has been done, for example, with professional associations and
limited partnerships with corporate general partners. See Stein, supra at 436-37. A
better resolution would be to take the regulations at their face value-that is, there is
a general rule (management concentration) and a specific rule for limited partnerships
(substantial interest ownership). The reason why limited partners are excluded from
the general rule is that although the general partners in fact have management control,
they are not analogous to a corporate board of directors, which is the benchmark of
centralized management. Treas. Reg. § 301.7 701- 2 (c) (1) (1965). The general part-
ners act for themselves and not for the limited partners; thus, general partners are not
the agents of the limited partners, as the corporate board of directors are of their stock-
holders. See Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176, 185 (1942) ; Aron-
sohn, supra note 1, at 590-91. Since limited partnerships are not subject to the general
rule, the regulations adopted a specific rule to deal with them. The inquiry, therefore,
is whether a "substantial interest" is present, and the example in the regulations refer-
ring to centralized management in a limited partnership as a consequence of both
management concentration and substantial interest is superfluity to the extent that it
connects management concentration to limited partnerships.
The relevant ownership interest is a capital interest, NVILLs, supra note 49, § 1.05,
and not a management interest, as has been erroneously suggested. Stein, supra at 441-
44. The error of thinking that the relevant ownership interest is a management in-
terest is made by juxtaposing the general rule to the specifi6 rule, and then concluding
that if the limited partners have a "substantial interest" they also have "the exclusive
authority to make independent business decisions." This, in turn, assumes that the
"substantial interest" must be an interest in partnership management. But if the lim-
ited partners had the decision-making authority, they would then be taking part in the
control of the business, which would cause them to lose their limited liability, IND. CODE
§ 23-4-1-7 (1971), IxD. ANN. STAT. § 50-127 (1964), a result not likely to have been
contemplated by the regulations. Though a substantial interest in management cer-
tainly bears on the presence, in fact, of limited liability, it should have no place in the
centralization question. The regulations refer to a "substantial interest" that is "owned"
by the limited partners, and would thus seem to refer to an interest in the partnership
capital, or, possibly, partnership profits. See WILLis, upra note 49, § 1.05. Thus, to
focus on the degree of management control to answer the centralization issue is to err
by treating the applicable regulation as a single rule, rather than as one general rule
which has a specific adaptation for limited partnerships.
73. See WILLIs, supra note 49, § 1.05.
74. The most important authority is probably Glensder Textile Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), where the general partners had a 42 per cent interest. The
court's holding that centralized management was not present can be interpreted to mean
that 42 per cent is substantial and that 58 per cent was not substantially all. Similarly,
it has been observed that the IRS will hold that a corporate general partner owns a
"substantial interest" if it has a twenty per cent interest in the capital or profits of the
limited partnership. Points to Remember, Classification of Limited Partnerships: Rid-
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(3) Limited Liability
The corporate characteristic of limited liability exists only if no mem-
ber of the partnership "is personally liable for the debts of, or claims
against, the organization."7 In the case of a limited partnership, personal
liability will ordinarily exist in all general partners,"' So that this char-
acteristic will usually pose little difficulty. Danger will arise only if the
individual general partner has no substantial assets, beyond a partnership
interest, because he will then lose the personal liability.' In the ordinary
limited partnership, then, this characteristic is avoided simply by insur-
ing that the general partners have substantial assets.
(4) Free Transferability of Interests
This last corporate characteristic is present only if each partnership
member has the power to substitute a nonmember in his place, with all the
attributes of his prior interest, without the consent of the other members."s
Since this is a matter of contract law, however, it may be easily avoided
by providing in the partnership agreement that a transferee shall have
an interest in partnership profits, but not in partnership management, 9
or that a transferee may become substituted only with the consent of the
remaining partners." If it is provided that a member may transfer his
interest, but as a condition precedent the transferor must first offer his
interest to the other members at its fair market value, there is present only
a modified form of free transferability, which is of lesser weight in finding
an associational status than would be an unmodified form.8'
ing Guidelines, 24 TAx LAw. 605, 606 (1971). There is, however, very little authority
on this point, and the IRS might follow its position in the "C" reorganization area that
the "substantially all" question is to be determined on a case-by-case approach. Rev.
Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 253. See generally BiTTrER & EusTICE, supra note 9,
14.14.
75. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1965).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 301.7701-2(d) (2). The general partner also loses personal liability if he
is a "dummy" for the limited partners, id., but when this is the case the limited partners
concurrently become personally liable, thereby preventing the existence of the limited
liability characteristic. Id. The limited liability rules as announced in the regulations
are criticized in Aronsohn, supra note 1, at 593-94.
78. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1965).
79. Id.
80. Id. § 301.7701-3(2) (example 1). In Indiana, a transferee becomes a substi-
tuted partner-that is, one with all his predecessor's rights-only by consent of all part-
nership members, unless the certificate provides to the contrary. IND. CODE § 23-4-2-
19(4) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-139(4) (1964). If such consent is not given, and
the certificate does not provide that consent is not necessary, the transferee has an in-
terest in the profits, but not the management, of the partnership. IND. CODE § 23-4-2-
19(3) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-139(3) (1964).
81. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960). The regulations also specify that
factors in addition to the four discussed may be considered in some cases. Id. § 301.7701-
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From this review of the corporate characteristics considered in decid-
ing whether a partnership is to be taxed as a corporation, it should be ap-
parent that the associational taint may be easily avoided by careful plan-
ning and drafting. In undertaking these procedures, the requirements of
the limited partnership form must also be kept in mind to insure that a tax
benefit is not accomplished at the sacrifice of one or another of the benefits
of the limited partnership itself.
Problems Incident to Allocation and Basis
In most investment groups, the various members will have expressed
different investment objectives: some will want only current income,
while others will want both income and the benefits of a tax shelter. This
can be accomplished without too much difficulty in the partnership form
of organization, since one of its chief tax advantages, provided in § 704
of the Internal Revenue Code, is the ability to allocate partnership income,
gain, loss, deduction or credit pursuant to the partnership agreement . 2
Thus, the partners may allocate specific items to reflect the property each
has contributed, 3 or to otherwise satisfy the objectives of the individual
partners. If, however, the principal purpose of such allocation is to avoid
or evade federal income tax, it will be disregarded84 and the allocation will
be made in accordance with the ratio used to divide partnership profits and
losses."
The key, of course, is to determine when, in fact, an allocation is made
for the principal purpose of evading taxation. The regulations provide six
relevant circumstances which will be considered: (1) whether there is
a "business purpose" for the allocation; (2) whether it has a substantial
2(a) (1). The only additional factor that appears to have been considered is the fact
that real property is held in the partnership's name. See Aronsohn, .supra note 1, at 591
n.32. Inasmuch as the Uniform Partnership Act specifically provides for the entity
holding of real property, UNioTRm PARTNERSHIP AcT § 8 (adopted in Indiana, IND. CODE
§ 23-4-1-8(3) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-408(3) (1964)), and its provisions apply
to limited partnerships, except where they are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, UNIFORM PARTNERSHip AcT § 6 (adopted in Indiana,
IND. CODE § 23-4-1-6(2) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-406(2) (1964)), this factor
should not be material. See Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176, 186-
87 (1942) ; Aronsohn, supra note 1, at 591 n.32.
82. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 704(a).
83. The rules relating to contributed property are set forth at INT. Rxv. CODE of
1954, § 704(c).
84. INT. RM. CODE Of 1954, § 704(b) (2).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (2) (1956). See also Rev. Rul. 68-139, 1968-1 Cum.
BULL. 311; Smith v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Jean V. Kresser, 54
T.C. 1621 (1970). See generally Gould, supra note 2; Koff, Partnerships and the Spe-
cial Allocation: The Winds of Change, 50 TAXEs 5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Koff] ;
McGuire, When Will a Special Allocation Among Partners be Recognized?, 37 J. TAX.
74 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McGuire].
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economic effect independent of tax consequences; (3) whether related
items are subject to the same allocation; (4) whether it was made with-
out recognition of normal business factors and only after the amount
specially allocated could be reasonably estimated; (5) the duration of the
allocation; and (6) its overall tax consequences.8" There has, unfor-
tunately, been no definitive case to explain which of these factors is para-
mount, though the Senate Report accompanying the introduction of §
704 in 1954. did indicate that the primary factor was the presence or
absence of an economic effect from the allocation, independent of its tax
consequences." Probably the best that can be said of the tests set out in
the regulations, is that each is simply one element of an entire picture, 8
and that the presence of one, or, conversely, all but one, should not be
conclusive.89 In other words, all the facts and circumstances relating to
the allocation must be taken into account.
(1) Allocation of Depreciation
Where some members of a group investing in real estate seek current
income while others seek tax shelter benefits-that is, where one group
takes the bulk of the cash flow and the other receives a nominal return
on their investment in return for a disproportionate share in the deprecia-
tion shelter °--the easiest way to achieve their objectives would be to
allocate a large part of the income to one group and the remaining income
and expense items, primarily depreciation, to the other. Central in this
scheme, of course, would be the allocation of depreciation to the group
seeking tax shelter benefits, since depreciation will ordinarily be the largest
single expensible figure. Whether such an allocation can be properly
made, however, is unclear.
Although there is very little authority on the allocation of deprecia-
tion in real estate partnerships, it has often been assumed that any such
allocation would be difficult to justify in terms of a substantial economic
effect independent of its tax consequences. 1 The Tax Court, however, has
recently indicated that this is only the first difficulty. In Stanley C. Or-
risch,9 2 a partnership had been formed between family C and family 0,
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (2) (1956). The impact of each of these criteria is
analyzed in Driscoll, Tax Problems of Partnerships-Special Allocation of Specific
Items, 10 U. So. CAL. 1958 TAx INST. 421, 428-38 [hereinafter cited as Driscoll].
87. S. REP. No. 1661, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954). See also Rev. Rul. 66-187,
1966-2 Cum. BULL. 246.
88. See Driscoll, supra note 86, at 435. See also Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395
(1970).
89. WILLIS, supra note 49, § 19.03.
90. See Aronsohn, supra note 1, at 607; Driscoll, supra note 86, at 438.
91. WILLIs, supra note 49, § 19.09; Aronsohn, supra note 1, at 609.
92. 55 T.C. 395 (1970).
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to invest in residential apartment buildings. The partners, C and 0, agreed
to share profits and losses equally. For the first three years of its opera-
tion, the partnership suffered net operating losses, largely because of the
use of accelerated depreciation. Inasmuch as partner C had no net income
-the result of deductible losses from other businesses-O and C then
agreed to specially allocate all depreciation to 0, with gain and loss, com-
puted without regard to depreciation, to be divided equally. They also
agreed that in the event of sale, the depreciation should be "charged back"
to O's capital account.
On these facts, the Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner's con-
clusion that the depreciation allocation was made for the principal purpose
of avoiding taxation, and that, therefore, the depreciation would be al-
located in accordance with the division of profits and losses generally.
The court noted that the tax avoidance purpose was plain from the fact
that depreciation was the only item specially allocated-both income and
operating expenses from the buildings were divided equally. Because
the depreciation figure did not vary, the partners also ran afoul of the
rule which taints allocations made after the amount allocated can be easily
estimated. In addition, the partner who received no depreciation, C, had
no taxable income from which to deduct the depreciation figure, and
he was protected from capital gains tax in the event of sale because of the
depreciation "charge back." These factors made it "unmistakably dear,"
the court said, "that the agreement did not reflect normal business consi-
derations but was designed primarily to minimize the overall tax liabilities
of the partners." 3 Thus, Orrisch may be said to stand for the rule that
a depreciation allocation must have a substantial independent economic
impact as well as a business purpose,9 in order to be given its intended
effect.
Although there is room in Orrisch for a permissible allocation,"5 it is
far from clear whether such an allocation could be accomplished with any
degree of certainty as to its viability." This is especially true in light of
the IRS's reluctance to grant favorable rulings in this area.9
93. Id. at 401.
94. This rule had been suggested in previous commentary. See Driscoll, supra note
86, at 429.
95. See Long, Tax Shelter in Real Estate Partnership: An Analysis of Tax Haz-
ards that Still Exist, 36 J. TAX. 312, 314-15 (1972) ; Shapiro, Tax Planning for Equity
Financing by Real Estate Developers, 50 TAXES 530, 538-40 (1972).
96. The lack of certainty in this area has been attributed either to the fact that
special allocations are seldom made, or to the IRS's failure to challenge them. WnLus,
supra note 49, § 19.13. Orriseh may indicate, at the very least, that the latter is not a
proper assumption.
97. In Rev. Rul. 68-139, 1968-1 Cum. BuLL. 311, the IRS ruled that it would recog-
nize an agreement whereby two of three investors who contributed all the money for an
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(2) How the Allocation Objectives May Be Accomplished
Assuming that no rational group of investors would pursue a course
that would invite tax litigation, it will be prudent to look into other means
of accomplishing their allocation objectives. Instead of allocating deprecia-
tion, a better approach may be to allocate profits and losses, and not de-
preciation as such, since profit and loss allocations are not themselves re-
quired to meet the principal purpose test of § 704(b).' s Unfortunately,
profit and loss allocation will not have the desirable result of channeling
cash flow to one group while the tax shelter covers the other group of in-
vestors. Under such an allocational scheme, each partner would simply
receive a given share of an aggregate figure, instead of receiving, as his
investment objectives would require, a dissimilar piece of the aggregate
itself.
The desired allocation may, however, be accomplished by careful
planning. One such plan might, for example, be that a limited partner-
ship be established with a corporate general partner which would make a
Subchapter S election. Those investors who seek current income could
then become shareholders of the corporate general partner, and those seek-
ing tax shelter benefits would become the limited partners. The corpor-
ate general partner would, furthermore, negotiate a management con-
tract with the partnership, which would call for reasonable compensation
to manage all investment properties of the partnership. It would also
manage any othei outside properties it could handle and lease equip-
ment and furnishings to the partnership, the tenants of its properties, or
any other potentially profitable lessee."9
oil and gas partnership were entitled to a 3/32d working interest in the leases and to all
drilling and development cost deductions. The IRS tempered its ruling by stating that
the allocation would not be recognized if its principal purpose was tax avoidance. The
reluctance of the IRS to rule categorically in this context indicates the uncertain ground
upon which any allocation will rest.
98. The Tax Court's opinion in Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970), indicates that
the principal purpose test does not apply to loss allocations. Although the court did not
reach a decision on the question, it did note that the language and legislative history of
§ 704 support the argument that the principal purpose test is inapplicable to loss alloca-
tions. Id. at 1631 n.5. See also 6 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INco E TAXATION §
35.29 (1968) ; Aronsohn, supra note 1, at 610; Driscoll, supra note 86, at 438-39; Koff,
supra note 85, at 8 n.8. But of. McGuire, supra note 85, at 76.
99. The attempted use of a Subchapter S corporation as the general partner would,
of course, raise the question of whether the twenty per cent passive income termination
rule would preclude Subchapter S status. This rule was already analyzed in consider-
able detail with regard to the choice of organizational form, see notes 20-25 supra & text
accompanying, and that discussion will answer the present inquiry without much diffi-
culty.
Inasmuch as any real estate investment partnership will produce income which will
be defined as "rents" for purposes of the passive investment income rule, it is almost
certain that the corporation's share in the partnership profits will be passive investment
income. See notes 20-25 supra & text accompanying. Thus, the corporation will be re-
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This framework, if permissible, would meet the investment objec-
tives of the two groups of investors. Thus, on any particular real estate
investment a large part of the cash flow, after payment of mortgage and
other financial commitments, could be paid to the corporate general part-
ner pursuant to the management contract, as well as by its share in the
profits of the partnership, so that its shareholders would be able to realize
their current income objectives. Since the management fee paid to the
corporate general partner would add to the already high expense items of
the limited partnership, which would be the primary result of accelerated
depreciation and interest deductions, the partnership would then be likely
to have a substantial net operating loss, despite a possibly positive cash
quired to include its allocable share of the gross receipts of the partnership in determin-
ing whether it has received more than twenty per cent passive investment income.
To minimize the possibility of violating the passive income taint, the corporation
could simply see to it that it got a lesser percentage allocation in the partnership agree-
ment in return for a proportionately larger management fee. The "non-rent" status of
management fees is indicated by Rev. Rul. 61-112, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 399, where a
Subchapter S corporation had leased farms on a "share-farming" arrangement, and the
president of the corporation made all management decisions. Placing heavy emphasis
on the performance of the management functions, the IRS held that the amounts received
by the corporation did not constitute "rents" within the meaning of § 1372(e) (5). This
is the proper result, since the performance of management duties is the antithesis of
"passive" income because it involves the "active" conduct of business, against which
the passive income rule was not directed. See note 19 supra & text accompanying. To
insure its compliance with the passive income termination rule, therefore, the corporation
should insure that its management fees would exceed eighty per cent of its total income.
A similar result is reached with regard to the leasing of equipment and furnishings
by the general partner to the partnership, as well as to other lessees. The IRS has
taken the position that the leasing of personalty where maintenance services are also
provided does not result in the receipt of "rents." See Rev. Rul. 70-206, 1970-1 CuM.
BULL. 177; Rev. Rul. 65-83, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 430; Rev. Rul. 65-91, 1965-1 Cum. BULL.
431.
If a Subchapter S election is made by the corporate general partner, attention should
also be given to the use of "§ 1244 stock." Basically, § 1244 provides that a loss of no
more than 25,000 dollars on stock issued by a qualifying "small business corporation"
pursuant to a plan, to an individual or partnership, will be treated as an ordinary income
loss, rather than as a capital loss. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1244(a)-(b). To qualify
as a "small business corporation," the sum of the aggregate amount of stock offered
plus the aggregate value of money and other property received by the corporation must
not exceed 500,000 dollars, and the sum of the aggregate amount offered plus the equity
capital of the corporation must not exceed one million dollars. Id. § 1244(c) (2).
The chief limitation on the use of § 1244 stock is that the receipt of more than
fifty per cent of gross receipts from rents, interests and other "investments" items will
preclude application of the favorable loss rules. Id. § 1244(c) (1) (E). As previously
discussed, however, the corporate general partner may be able to avoid the receipt of
passive income, and thereby moot the fifty per cent rule. More important, though, is the
fact that even if the fifty per cent rule is violated, the shareholders would lose nothing;
the stock would simply lose its § 1244 status, and take on the "capital" character that
it would have had in any event. See BITTKER & EUsTIcE, supra note 9, f[ 4.09. See also
Bledsoe & Beck, Two Problems Under Section 12.1: Real Estate Investments and Part-
ners as Stockholders, 16 J. TAx. 7 (1962); Tigner, Organizational Forms for Real
Estate Ventures: Selected Tax Considerations, 2 MEMPrulS ST. U.L. Rav. 259, 274-75
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Tigner].
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flow. This would create the tax shelter sought by the limited partners.
Having proposed this framework as one means of meeting the al-
location objectives of the common group of real estate investors, the next
step is to analyze its several components to see whether it will satisfactorily
accomplish the respective investment objectives.
a. Payment of Management Fees to the General Partner
As noted, one means of paying current income to the shareholders of
the corporate general partner would be to negotiate a contract between the
limited partnership and the corporation for a management fee, which
would be in addition to the corporation's share of partnership profits and
losses. Such an arrangement is sanctioned by the tax code, which provides
in § 707(c) that payments made by a partnership to a partner for ser-
vices rendered shall be treated as if they were made to a nonpartner, so
long as they are not determined by reference to the income of the partner-
ship'. ---that is, the payments must be fixed and guaranteed and not de-
terminable in accordance with partnership income or profit.' If the pay-
ment is based upon partnership profit, it will be treated as a part of the
partner's distributive share, rather than as a deductible expense of the
partnership. On the other hand, if the payment is guaranteed, it will be
treated as salary income to the recipient and as a business deduction to
the partnership."0 2 To insure that the payment is, indeed, salary, and not
merely a part of the partner's distributive share, the "guarantee" should be
placed in the partnership agreement. 3
The effect of § 707(c) and the potential benefits of such a manage-
ment contract arrangement may be illustrated by Revenue Ruling 56-
675,"0 where a partnership was formed by three persons, each of whom
contributed equally to its capital in return for a one-third interest in pro-
fits and losses. The partners then selected one partner to act as manager,
and he was given a guaranteed sum for management services. This was
held to be a guaranteed payment within § 707(c). The payment, how-
100. Foster v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 291, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd on
other grounds, 329 F2d 717 (2d Cir. 1964) ; F. A. Falconer, 40 T.C. 1011, 1015 (1963).
101. This treatment only applies for the purposes of § 61(a) (relating to gross
income) and § 162(a) (relating to trade and business expenses). INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 707(c). But in Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968), the court
allowed the partnership a § 119 deduction for meals and lodging for the expenses of a
partner whom the court treated as an employee. In light of the express language of
§ 707(c), however, the case seems to be based upon a rather slim foundation. See WVIL-
LIs, supra note 49, § 16.02.
102. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 387 (1954).
103. Foster v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 291, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd on other
grounds, 329 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1964).
104. Rev. Rul. 56-675, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 459. See also F. A. Falconer, 40 T.C.
1011 (1963); Rev. Rul. 66-95, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 169.
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ever, created a net operating loss to the partnership, so that the taxpayer
received as income the guaranteed payment, against which he could offset
his one-third share in the operating loss.
There do not, then, seem to be any tax problems incident to a man-
agement contract executed between a corporate general partner and the
limited partnership. Similarly, there are no rules of partnership law that
would affect the transaction. Although the Indiana Partnership Act does
preclude partners from receiving remuneration for acting in the partner-
ship business,' that rule applies only if no agreement to the contrary is
made between the partners."'8 Such a management contract, therefore,
appears to be a permissible means of allocating the cash flow to those
investors seeking current income." 7
b. Allocation of Profits and Losses
Having concluded that the income objectives of the shareholders of
the corporate general partner may be effectuated primarily by the manage-
ment contract, the next issue is the allocation of partnership profits and
losses. Since little difficulty is encountered with respect to the allocation
of profits, which may be allocated by partnership agreement without re-
gard to the tax avoidance rule,' the discussion will relate primarily to
losses. These are of particular importance in real estate investment part-
nerships because it is the nature of such investment vehicles to generate,
at least in their early years, net operating losses-chiefly as a consequence
of accelerated depredation and other "expensible" charges, such as man-
agement contracts with general partners.
Inasmuch as the shareholders of the corporate general partner will
receive the bulk of their current income, which was their presumed in-
vestment objective, from the management contract and the corpora-
tion's share in such profits as may exist, the first question is whether all
losses of the partnership may be entirely allocated to the limited partners,
which will be a necessary element in establiching their tax shelter objective.
As already noted, the allocation of profit and loss as such need not
105. IND. CODE § 23-4-1-18(f) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-418(f) (1964).
106. IND. CODE § 23-4-1-18 (1971), IND. ANx. STAT. § 50-418 (1964).
107. See generally Alexander, supra note 25, at 217.
It is to be noted that in its revised proposed statement of policy, the Midwest Se-
curities Commissioner Association has proposed limitations on the payment of manage-
ment fees to limited partners. Stateinent of Policy Regarding Real Estate Limited
Partnership, BLUE SKY L. .EP. No. 458 (Dec. 4, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Statement
of Policy]. Although the impact of this proposal is unclear in both scope and meaning,
it may be evidence of a feeling that limitations should be placed on management fees.
In that event, of course, another scheme would have to be adopted if it were crucial to
avoid the policy proposed by the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association.
108. See note 98 supra.
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meet the tax avoidance rule of § 704(b) (2), and so long as the partner-
ship agreement directs all losses to be shared among the limited partners
there should be no problem in making that allocation."'
The ability to make the loss allocation among the limited partners,
however, is only the first problem, since there is also a limit on the deduc-
tibility of such losses. Section 704(d) provides that a partner's distri-
butive share of partnership losses shall be an allowable deduction only to
the extent of the adjusted basis of the partner's interest in the partner-
ship at the end of the year in which the loss occurred.1 The initial basis
of a partner's interest is acquired by the contribution of money or property,
in an amount equal to the money contributed or the adjusted basis of the
property."' The partner's basis is then increased by the amount of his
share in the liabilities of the partnership and his individual liability."' In
the case of a limited partnership, these rules are modified only slightly.
A limited partner's share of partnership liabilities cannot normally exceed
the difference between his actual contribution and that which he is obli-
gated to make under the partnership agreement."' Where, however, none
of the partners have personal liability on partnership liabilities-as in the
case of a real estate mortgage acquired by the partnership as a whole-
the limited partners may share such liability in the same proportion that
they share in profits."' The sharing in accordance with the profit ratio
is significant since in all other situations partnerships' liabilities are shared
pursuant to loss ratios."15
Thus, it is clear that it will be highly desirable for limited partners
in a partnership engaged in real estate investment to be able to add mort-
gage indebtedness to their adjusted basis. This may not, however, be an
109. This would be especially clear if the limited partners made all capital con-
tributions, with the general partner contributing some other factor in return for its
share in partnership profits. The allocation would then have the substantial economic
effect of returning to the limited partners a portion of their capital contribution, i.e., a
return in terms of tax shelter savings, as well as a business purpose, i.e., inducing
persons to join the limited partnership.
110. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 704(d).
111. Id. § 722. The adjusted basis is computed pursuant to § 705 of the Code.
112. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 752(a).
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
114. Id. See also Curtis W. Kingbay, 46 T.C. 147 (1966); Fine, Real Property
and the Internal Revenue Code: A Potpourri of Tax Problems Involving Lessors, Les-
sees, and Others, 51 CHI. B. REv. 359, 365-66 (1970). It has been argued that Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-1(e) is erroneous to the extent that it precludes a limited partner from in-
cluding in his basis from the outset indebtedness for which the general partner is liable.
Epstein, The Application of the Crane Doctrine to Limited Partnerships, 45 S. CAL-. L.
REv. 100, 129-30 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Epstein]. This argument is based upon
analogy to the cases allowing contingent obligations to be included in basis calculation.
Id. at 107-14.
115. WILLIS, supra note 49, § 17.05. See generally Alexander, supra note 25, at
204-06.
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easy task and will certainly require advance planning." 6 This first step
is to note again that the regulations provide that a limited partner's share
of liabilities shall not exceed the difference between his actual contribution
and the contribution that he is obligated to make under the partnership
agreement. Thus, before a limited partner can claim any share in liabili-
ties, he must be bound by the partnership agreement to contribute addi-
tional capital-and an "agreement," for this purpose, means a specific
agreement to contribute to the partnership, not an agreement to indem-
nify the general partner in the event of loss. "' However, such an agree-
ment may not be particularly attractive to a limited partner, who presum-
ably chose that status to find limited liability, because circumstances may
arise where he would be forced to make the contribution, and the agree-
ment will then be an enforceable debt to the partnership." 8
If the limited partner will not agree to a sufficient increase in his
contribution obligation, then the partnership must be able to obtain non-
recourse financing-that is, there must be no personal liability on the
indebtedness. The easiest way of accomplishing that result, of course,
would be to simply have neither the general nor limited partners, nor the
partnership itself, assume liability on the mortgage. This might be ac-
complished by several means. The property could, first of all, be pur-
chased by the partnership, with the mortgage being secured by the pro-
perty itself and not by any personal assumption of liability by a partner,
116. The danger in not planning ahead is illustrated by the result in Curtis W.
Kingbay, 46 T.C. 147 (1966). There the limited partners were specifically said not to
be liable for any additional contribution, and all indebtedness was taken in the name
of the corporate general partner. Trying to find a means which would allow them to
deduct losses of the partnership, the limited partners sought to argue that the corporate
general partner was a dummy, and that loans to the partnership were contributions to
capital, though they had been evidenced by notes payable. The Tax Court rejected both
arguments, requiring the limited partners to live with the form in which they had cast
their partnership. It should be noted that there was no argument by the Commissioner
on the associational question in Kingbay, see notes 60-81 supra & text accompanying,
although it was unquestionably present. See WMLIS, supra note 49, § 17.05.
117. See Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969-1 Cum. BuLu. 184.
118. IND. CODE § 23-4-2-17(1) (b) (1971), IND. AN. STAT. § 50-137(1) (b)
(1964).
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). Perhaps the best example of such a pro-
cedure, though not involving a limited partnership situation, can be found in David F.
Bolger, 59 T.C. No. 75 (1973). In Bolger, a corporation was used to obtain full non-
recourse financing for the purchase of real property. After financing was obtained, the
property was deeded to the corporation's shareholders. The shareholders were allowed
to claim depreciation deductions on the property and to use the mortgage indebtedness
incurred by the corporation in obtaining financing to increase their basis for deduction
purposes even though they had not assumed personal liability on the mortgages. See note
29 supra. The benefits of the scheme approved by the Tax Court in Bolger could be ob-
tained in the limited partnership context, without sacrificing the benefits of the limited
partnership form, by having a corporation distribute its property to the limited partner-
ship rather than to the corporation's shareholders.
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general or limited.1 9 Alternatively, the property could be placed in a
land trust with the partnership as a beneficiary, and the trustee executing
the mortgage and loan agreement, 2 ' or the property could be purchased,
and the indebtedness assumed, by the general partner, who would then
convey the property to the partnership subject to the indebtedness, which
would not be assumed by the partnership.' The difficulty with these
approaches is that lenders may require personal liability, and in that event
there may be no way for the partners to share in the liabilities, though
suggestions have been made to cover even this situation. 2 If the limited
partners cannot use a share of the liabilities to increase their basis, they
can at least take solace in the fact that operating losses disallowed under
§ 704 (d) may, to a limited extent, indefinitely carried forward.' 2
For the limited partners to share in partnership liabilities for the
purpose of increasing their adjusted basis to facilitate operating loss de-
ductions, then, there must be an obligation for them to contribute addi-
tional capital in at least their share of the liabilities, or there must be
no personal liability on the partnership liability. 2 4
To make this analysis complete, attention must also be given to the
effects on the limited partner of disposition of the mortgage-encumberea
property. In Crane v. Commissioier,'25 the Supreme Court held that upon
disposition of mortgage-encumbered property, the "amount realized"
would be the amount of cash received plus the amount of the mortgage,
although neither the seller nor the buyer had ever personally assumed the
mortgage. 6 Thus, if a limited partner is able to share in partnership
liabilities to increase his adjusted basis, he will, on disposition of the pro-
perty by the partnership, be taxable on his share of the mortgage. 2 ' This
120. Blubm, Tax Considerations in Financing Real Estate Transactions, 47 TAXES
844, 847-48 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bluhm].
121. See WILLIS, supra note 49, § 17.05. However, this approach appears to be
precluded by the regulations, which say that a limited partner may have a share of the
liabilities only "where none of the partners have any personal liability...." Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
Other methods in addition to those considered in the text are considered in Shapiro,
Tax Planning for Equity Financing by Real Estate Developers, 50 TAXES 530, 532
(1972).
122. For example, it has been suggested that more than one mortgage might be
executed, and that personal liability be omitted from at least one. Bluhm, supra note
120, at 848.
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(d) (1) (1956) ; see also WILLIS, supra note 49, § 18.02;
Bluhm, supra note 120, at 848-49; Tigner, supra note 99, at 266-67.
124. It should also be observed that if the limited partners do increase their basis
by their share of partnership liabilities, they will also be able to claim a proportionate
amount of the allowable depreciation on the properties. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947) ; WILLIS, supra note 49, § 18.04.
125. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
126. Id. at 12-14.
127. See W.LLIS, supra note 49, § 18.04. See generally Epstein, supra note 114.
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is not, however, necessarily an unattractive feature. First, the net effect
of the transactions will be that the taxpaying limited partners will have
achieved the tax shelter benefit, since the amount of gain which will be
taxed at capital gain rates will equal the excess of their prior deductions
for depreciation, interest, and operating losses over their capital invest-
ments. Second, the time for taxation will have been long postponed,
and when it occurs it will be at capital gains rates, subject, of course, to
whatever § 1245 or § 1250 recapture is required. Third, if he dies, the
limited partner's basis will be "stepped-up" in the hands of his heirs or
devisees.' Finally, if the taxpayer exchanges his property in a like-kind
exchange, 1 2 ' he may postpone most tax even further."' 0
In light of this discussion, therefore, it seems clear that the invest-
ment objectives of the common investment group may be accomplished by
a profit and loss allocation among the partners, both general and limited,
together with a management contract between the corporate general part-
ner and the limited partnership.
Use of a Corporation as the General Partner
In the allocation scheme assumed hypothetically, it has been proposed
that the general partner in the limited partnership be a corporation. The
employment of a corporate general partner is, in fact, the best means of
fully reaping the benefits of a limited partnership.' By so doing, the in-
vestors will obtain virtually complete limitation of liability, they will
avoid any state usury law restrictions, and concern over the death of par-
ticipants will be ameliorated. Use of a corporate general partner does,
however, raise two troublesome questions: first, whether a corporation
has the power to enter a partnership; and second, if it does become the
general partner, whether the limited partnership would then be classified
as a corporation for tax purposes.
(1) The Power to Enter a Partnership
As a general rule, a corporation may not enter into a partnership,
unless the power to do so is expressly conferred, for in so doing it would
lose its identity, and the direction of at least part of its affairs would be
placed in hands other than those contemplated by its charter." 2 Although
128. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014.
129. Id. § 1031.
130. All of the advantages are discussed in WILLIS, supra note 49, § 18.04; Epstein,
supra note 114, at 102-03.
131. See Aronsohn, supra note 1, at 589-90; Comment, The Limited Partnership
with a Corporate General Partner-Federal Taxation-Partnership or Association, 24 Sw.
LJ. 285 (1970).
132. See 6 W. FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
2520 (perm. ed. 1968); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 917, 920-21 (1958).
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this rule was at one time followed in Indiana,"' it is no longer the pre-
vailing view. Thus, the Attorney General has said that so long as its
articles of incorporation expressly provide the power to enter a partner-
ship, a corporation may lawfully do so."a This result could also be reach-
ed through the express language of the Indiana versions of the Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA) and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(ULPA), inasmuch as the ULPA defines a limited partnership as one
formed by two or more "persons" '' and the UPA defines "persons" to
include corporations."8 Moreover, the UPA applies to the ULPA, except
when its provisions are inconsistent with those of the ULPA."'3 With
regard to the first question, then, it may be safely concluded that a cor-
poration may be a general partner in a limited partnership in Indiana."'
(2) Avoiding Entity Taxation as a Corporation
Presumably because the use of a corporation as the general partner
in a limited partnership is so beneficial, the IRS has recently adopted an
"associational" ruling posture that is far more stringent than that formally
set forth in its regulations. This posture was promulgated in Rev. Proc.
72-13,' 39 in which the IRS said that in order to obtain a favorable ruling
as to the qualification for partnership status of a limited partnership which
has as its only general partner a corporation, the following tests must be
met: (1) the limited partners must not own, directly or indirectly, in-
dividually or in the aggregate, more than twenty per cent of the stock of
the corporate general partner, or any of its affiliates; (2) if the corpora-
tion has an interest in only one limited partnership and its contribution
thereto is less than 2,500,000 dollars, it must have a net worth at all
times of at least 15 per cent of the contribution or 250,000 dollars, which-
ever is lesser, and if the contribution exceeds 2,500,000 dollars, it must
have a net worth of at least ten per cent of that figure; (3) if the corpora-
133. Traders Loan & Investment Co. v. Butcher, 74 Ind. App. 548, 129 N.E. 257
(1920) (held that a corporation was estopped to deny its partnership status) ; Brenig v.
Sparrow, 39 Ind. App. 455, 80 N.E. 37 (1907).
134. Op. ATT'y GEN. IND. 225, 228 (1951).
135. IND. CODE § 23-4-2-1 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-121 (1964) (adopting
UNIFORm LiMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 1).
136. IND. CODE § 23-4-1-2 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-402 (1964) (adopting
UNIFORM PARTNERsHIP AcT § 2).
137. IND. CODE § 23-4-1-6(2) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-406(2) (1964) (adopt-
ing UNIFORm PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6).
138. See generally Rowley, The Corporate Partner, 14 MINN. L. Rxv. 769 (1930);
Stein, supra note 7, at 436; Comment, Landing the Gentry: Real Estate in'vestinent as a
Means of Executive Compensation, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 962, 987-88 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Comment]. It may also be a limited partner. Note, Power of a Corporation to
Enter Into a Limited Partnership, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 265 (1956).
139. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2, at 26.
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tion has an interest in more than one limited partnership, the net worth
requirements in (2) must be met for each such partnership, and it must
have a net worth at least as great as the sum of the amounts required by
(2) for each separate partnership; (4) the purchase of a limited partner-
ship interest must not entail a mandatory or discretionary purchase of
any security in the corporate general partner or any of its affiliates; and
(5) the organization of the limited partnership must be in accord with
its applicable state laws.'4
Although the effect of this posture is to inhibit the use of a corpora-
tion as the limited partner,141 it does not prevent its employment. It
simply requires a more careful structuring of the organizational frame-
work."'2 The posture does, in fact, facilitate organizational planning and
will help to insure that the partnership will not be classified as an associa-
tion for tax purposes. 43 By complying with the requisites for a favorable
ruling, the planner can be certain of avoiding the limited liability char-
acteristic, since the regulations provide that where a corporation is the
general partner it will have personal liability if it has substantial assets
beyond its partnership interest,'" and compliance with the net worth
requirement will certainly give the corporation substantial assets. It will
also preclude any assertion that the corporation is a sham. In addition,
by providing the corporate general partner with substantial assets, it will
also be possible to insure that the limited partners do not own substanti-
ally all the interests in the partnership, thereby avoiding the centralization
of management characteristic as well. 45 It should be kept in mind, how-
ever, that Rev. Proc. 72-13 specifically provides that in calculating the
net worth requirement, the corporate general partner's interest in the
partnership will be excluded. 46
Compliance with the Securities Laws
The use of a limited partnership will also involve securities regula-
140. Id. See generally Weiler, Limited Partnerships with Corporate General Part-
ners: Beyond Rev. Rul. 72-Y3, 36 1. TAx. 306 (1972).
Provisions similar to those in Rev. Rul. 72-13 are contained in Statement of Policy,
snpra note 107.
141. In an article discussing the use of a limited partnership engaged in real
estate investment as a means of executive compensation, the author suggests that the
safest course is to forego the use of a corporate general partner altogether in favor of
an individual. Comment, supra note 138, at 990.
142. See Stein, supra note 72, at 446-49.
143. The factors considered by the IRS in making the "associational" determina-
tion are considered at notes 60-81 supra & text accompanying.
144. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (2) (1960).
145. Id. § 301.7701-2(c) (4).
146. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972 INT. Rxv. BULL. No. 2, at 26.
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tion considerations, at both the state and federal levels. 47
(1) At the Federal Level
The basic question with regard to securities regulation, at least at
the preliminary planning stage, is whether the security being considered
must be registered.' The Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)"' pro-
vides that it shall be unlawful for any person to make use of any means
of interstate commerce to sell or deliver a security unless a registration
statement is in effect, or the security or transaction involved is subject
to one of the various exemptions provided."'
The first issue to be addressed, therefore, is whether a limited part-
nership interest is a "security," which is defined in § 2(1) of the 1933
Act as follows:
the term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract . . . or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security,' .....
Although at one time, there may have been some question, it is now un-
disputed that a limited partnership interest is a "security" for federal
securities regulation purposes."' This result has been reached by finding
that an interest in a limited partnership is an investment contract, which
was defined by the Supreme Court in SEC v. J. W. Howey Co."' to
include any "contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
147. If a corporate general partner is used, there will also be securities regulation
problems incident to the issuance of its stock, but since those problems are essentially
the same as those discussed in the text, they need not be further pursued.
148. See generally Rifkind & Borton, SEC Registration of Real Estate Interests:
An Overview, 27 Bus. LAW. 649 (1972). In some real estate investment projects, there
may also be a need to comply with the Interstate Land Sales Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20
(1970). See generally Wharton, Application of Federal and State Security Regulations
to Real Estate Transactions, 12 S. TEXAS LJ. 237, 238-39 (1971).
149. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1970).
150. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
151. Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
152. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877 (Aug. 8, 1967). See also Pawgan v.
Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347
(Jan. 4, 1973) (condominium unit offerings as securities). Prior to the issuance of
Release No. 4877, it had only been thought that a limited partnership interest inay be a
"security" for purposes of federal regulation. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
503 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. It should be noted that a result similar to
that decreed in Release No. 4877 has been reached under the Securities Act of 1934,
where Rule 3all-1 defines "equity securities" to include limited partnership interests.
17 C.F.R. § 240.3all-1 (1971) ; 4 Loss, supra at 2549.
153. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party. . "'" This conclusion is un-
doubtedly correct, since a limited partner will contribute his capital to a
venture in which he will have no active management participation in hopes
of sharing in the profits to be made by the efforts of others. 5
Although the limited partnership interest may be a "security" within
the § 2(1) definition, there are at least two exemptions available which
will in most cases eliminate the need for registration. The first is pro-
vided by § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, which exempts "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering""---that is, a private offering.
Whether a particular offering is "private" is a question of fact and re-
quires analysis of all the surrounding circumstances, including the relation
of the offerees and the issuer and the nature of the offering.' In SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co.,... the Supreme Court made it plain that the exemp-
tion was to be interpreted in light of the statutory purpose to provide all
investors with full disclosure of all information. Accordingly, the Court
adopted a test which looks at the sophistication of the offerees and their
access to corporate information to determine "whether the particular class
of persons affected need the protection of the Act." ' 9 Thus, if all the of-
ferees of a particular issue have sufficient business sophistication and in-
formation to "fend for themselves," they will be "non-Ralstonians"-
that is, informed investors who do not need the protection of the Act-
and the private offering exemption should be available. The number of
offerees may also be important. The SEC long followed a "rule of thumb"
154. Id. at 298.
155. Where this element is not present, however, the limited partnership interest
may not be considered a "security." Thus, in Romney v. Richard Prows, Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 313 (D. Utah 1968), it was held that the interest of one who had become a joint
venturer in an organization whose success would hinge to an important degree upon his
services was not a "security."
156. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). In considering
means of avoiding federal securities regulation requirements, it may be well to keep in
mind what is known as the "Regulation A" rules. Section 3(b) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970), authorizes the SEC to promulgate exemptions for
issues of securities which do not exceed 500,000 dollars. See SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5125 (Jan. 7, 1971). Pursuant to this authority, the SEC has adopted what
is known as Regulation A, which provides a simplified form of registration, rather than
an exemption from registration as such. See Glavin & Purcell, Securities Offerings and
Regulation A-Requircinents and Risks, 13 Bus. LAw. 303, 304 (1958). Though it may
save some filing costs because of the shortened registration form, Regulation A is rela-
tively unattractive simply because of the stringent rules applied to its use by the SEC.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (1972). Its attractiveness is also diminished by the fact
that the private offering and intrastate exemptions will ordinarliy be available to small
real estate investment projects. See generally Loss, supra note 152, at 609-35.
157. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
158. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
159. Id. at 125.
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that an offering to no more than 25 would be a private offering,"'0 and
although it is said that this rule is no longer followed,"0 ' the fact that it has
not been repudiated by the SEC indicates that it should be viewed as a
practical ceiling on the permissible number of offerees. The presence of
a private offering must, finally, include an analysis of whether, in fact, the
securities offered will "come to rest" in the hands of "non-Ralstonians,"
or whether the purchasers are merely conduits for a wider distribution." 2
Since the ordinary real estate investment group will be small, this
exemption would seem to be generally available. Because it has been
suggested that the private offering exemption "should be handled
gingerly,"'88 it will, however, be prudent in all cases to provide the par-
ticipants with all the information available to the group, as well as their
advisers and planners, so that all members will be "non-Ralstonians" who
do not require the protection of the securities laws." 4 With proper plan-
ning and dissemination, therefore, the private offering exemption can be
achieved.165
The second exemption provides that securities which are both of-
fered and sold exclusively to residents of the state in which the issuer is
both incorporated and doing business need not be registered.' This ex-
emption is applied literally, so that any sale to a nonresident will preclude
its application; there is no de minimis rule.6 ' The exemptive benefits
160. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935). See also Orrick,
Some Observations on the Administration of the Securities Laws, 42 MINN. L. REV. 25,
33 (1957).
161. See D. HERwiTZ, BUSINESS PLAxrNNNG 211-12 (1966).
162. SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange, 186 F. Supp. 830
(S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960). See also SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961).
163. Berger, Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and the Need for
Protection, 69 YALE L.J. 725, 770 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
164. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877 (Aug. 8, 1967) ; H. ROTHScHILD &
D. BERMAN, HOW TO INVEST AND PROTECT YoUR PROFITS iN REAL ESTATE SYNDICATES 11
(1964).
165. Loss, supra note 152, at 504-05.
166. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a) (11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (1970). See gen-
erally McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions Under the Federal Securities Laws,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 937 (1959).
167. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961). See also Stadia Oil &
Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 275 (10th Cir. 1957).
The requirements for compliance with the intrastate exemption of § 3 (a) (11) have
also been the subject of Proposed Rule 147, the purpose of which is to provide objective
standards for the guidance of those who seek the exemption's benefits. See SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5349 (Jan. 8, 1973), which also sets forth the purpose of the
exemption:
Section 3(a) (11) was intended to allow issuers with localized operations to sell
securities as part of a plan of local financing. Congress apparently believed
that a company whose operations are restricted to one area should be able to
raise money from investors in the immediate vicinity without having to register
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will also be denied if it is found that the sale to a resident was made with
a view toward resale to a nonresident in the near future."s Thus, the
issuers are, to some extent, at the mercy of their purchasers, since the
buyers may destroy the exemption by making the original purchase as a
nominee or trustee for a nonresident, or with a view to resale to a non-
resident.'
With these consideratons in mind, the intrastate exemption will de-
finitely be available to a limited partnership engaged in real estate invest-
ment only if (1) all investor-purchasers are residents of Indiana, (2)
they acquire their interest in their own behalf, with no view to resale or
other distribution to nonresidents, and (3) the entire investment enter-
prise is carried out in Indiana, thus making it subject to the cognizance
of Indiana securities regulation.' Although the limited partnership
interests are covered by the intrastate exemption, it should be kept in
mind that if the person offering the interests-for example, the general
partner who is also acting as a real estate investment promoter-does so
on a relatively regular basis on behalf of different partnerships, he may
be required to register as a broker-dealer under the rules of the Securitieg
Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)."'
Although it will not guarantee the availability of the intrastate ex-
emption, it may be prudent to include a statement in the limited partner-
ship agreement that all partners are residents of Indiana and that they are
not acting in an agency capacity for any nonresident. It may also be wise
to restrict the transferability of the interests, place restrictive legends on all
brochures, and obtain "investment letters" from all investors, which
should include the legend that all ownership and transfer rights are re-
stricted solely to Indiana residents.172 The planner should not have undue
difficulty in tailoring these provisions to the needs and objectives of the
parties, and in view of their additional, though, of course, not complete,
protection against inadvertent violation of the federal securities laws,
the securities with a federal agency. In theory, the investors would be pro-
tected both by their proximity to the issuer and by state regulation.
168. See SEC v. Hillsborough Investment Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H. 1958),
where the court said that it was a "devious and futile" attempt to invoke the § 3(a) (11)
exemption where the transfer was planned and carried out within a thirty-day period.
Id. at 88-9.
169. Greenwood, Syndication of Undeveloped Real Estate and Securities Law Im-
plations, 9 HOUSTON L. REv. 53, 66 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Greenwood].
170. Berger, s1pra note 163, at 769. The Indiana securities regulation scheme is
considered at notes 177-90 infra & text accompanying.
171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970). See Boetel & Co., [1971-72 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 78,343 (SEC 1971) ; see also SEC Securities Act Release No.
4877 (Aug. 8, 1967).
172. See Greenwood, supra note 169, at 66.
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their use should be given serious consideration." 8
It should also be kept in mind that although registration may or
may not be required, the anti-fraud and civil liability provisions of both
the 1933... and 1934 Acts'75 will continue to apply if the facilities of inter-
state commerce are utilized. 7
(2) At the State Level
Although there may be no need to register the securities at the federal
level, there is still the question of whether state registration is necessary.
Under the Indiana Securities Law,'7 7 it is unlawful for any person to
offer or sell a security unless it is either registered or the security or trans-
action is exempted."78 Registration, where necessary, may be accomp-
lished either by coordination with registration under the federal 1933
Act 79 or by specific Indiana qualification."8
The first question, again, is to ask whether a limited partnership
interest will be a statutory "security." The definition of a "security" in
173. There is also good reason, aside from the intrastate exemption rationale, for
including such provisions. Courts have often relied upon the presence or absence of the
partnership right of delechus personam--the right of members to consent to the substitu-
tion of a new member-in determining whether a "security" was present. See, e.g., Solo-
mont v. Polk Development Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 Cal. Rptr. -2 (1968) ; Rivlin v.
Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1961). This approach is reasonable
because an interest in a corporation is ordinarily fully transferable and should be a
security, whereas an interest in a bona fide limited partnership is transferable only with
unanimous member consent or certificate provision, and arguably should not be a se-
curity. Therefore, to avoid any inference that the limited partnership interest is trans-
ferable, the certificate should provide that no assignee may become a substituted limited
partner without the unanimous consent-the delectus personain--of all members of the
partnership. Although such a provision will not be conclusive on the "security" question,
"it should certainly be persuasive." Loss, stpra note 152, at 505.
In addition to their importance for purposes of complying with federal laws, re-
strictive provisions are a means of complying with the small offering exemption in the
Indiana Securities Law, IND. CODE § 23-2-1-2(b) (10) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-
855(b) (10) (1970), which requires that purchasers buy securities for investment pur-
poses only. See note 187 infra & text accompanying.
174. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1970).
175. Securities Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
176. See Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Loss, supra
note 152, at 710.
177. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1 et seq. (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-854 et seq. (1970).
See generally Masmas, Securities Issuance and Regulation: The -New Indiana Securities
Law, 38 IND. L.J. 38 (1962).
178. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-3 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-856 (1970).
179. IN . CODE § 23-2-1-4 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-858 (1970). "Coordina-
tion" simply refers to the procedure whereby an expedited process can be utilized to
register the security in Indiana if the same offering has been the subject of a registration
statement under the federal 1933 Act.
180. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-5 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-859 (1970). Both the
"coordination" and "qualification" procedures are discussed in Note, Securities Registra-
tion Requirements in Indiana, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 270, 272-74 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Note].
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the Indiana statute'8 ' is very similar to that in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act,'82
and although there is no Indiana ruling specifically including limited
partnership interests in that definition, the inclusive result reached at the
federal level,' and by many other states,' would certainly indicate that
Indiana courts might reach a similar result if the question were brought
before them,' though there is room for meritorious argument to the con-
trary. s18
181. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1(k) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-854(k) (1970), which
adopts the definition from the UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 401(1). See generally L.
Loss & E. CowETT, BLUE SKY LAw 350-51 (1958) [hereinafter cited as BLUE SKY LAw].
182. See note 151 supra & text accompanying.
183. See notes 151-54 supra & text accompanying.
184. See, e.g., People v. Hoshor, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 206 P.2d 882 (1949) ; People
v. Woodson, 78 Cal. App. 2d 132, 177 P.2d 586 (1947) ; Curtis v. Johnson, 92 Ill. App.
2d 141, 234 N.E.2d 566 (1968) ; State v. Simons, 238 P.2d 247 (Ore. 1951). See also
Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act,
33 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 363-67 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Dahlquist] ; Miller, supra note
59, at 382; Smith, Limited Partnership Interests as Securities Under the Corporate Se-
curities Act, 19 L.A. B. BULL. 257 (1944) ; Note, Sale of Limited Partnership Interests:
Rivlin v. Levine, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 176 (1962).
185. This might be inferred from the fact that the Indiana Court of Appeals has
already given an expansive definition to the term "security." In Holloway v. Thompson,
112 Ind. App. 229, 42 N.E.2d 421 (1942), the court said that the term included "any
form of investment used for the purpose of financing and promoting enterprises and
which is designed for investment." Id. at 239, 42 N.E2d at 425.
186. One seeking to argue that a limited partnership interest is not a "security"
might look to the California decisions. In Farnsworth v. Nevada-Cal Management,
Ltd., 183 Cal. App. 2d 382, 10 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1961), the court held that all limited part-
nership interests were exempt from registration requirements. This rule was then
limited in Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1961), to cover only
bona fide limited partnerships. The rule has since been followed in Solomont v. Polk
Development Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1966).
It should be noted, however, that these cases were decided under a California regis-
tration statute which specifically exempted general and limited partnership interests.
The California Securities Act has since been amended, and the exemption is no longer
available. Therefore, the probative value of the cases is questionable.
Attention might also be given to the New Jersey case of Conroy v. Schultz, 80 N.J.
Super. 443, 194 A.2d 20 (1963). Although Conroy arose under a statute adopting the
Uniform Securities Act definition of "security," New Jersey added to the definition
the following sentence:
"Security" means any . . . certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement including but not limited to certificates of interest
or participation in real or personal property....
N.J. REv. STAT. § 49:3-49(m) (1970). In Conroy, the defendant was engaged in the
real estate syndication business, and used limited partnerships, with the defendant being
the general partner, to obtain the capital for his various undertakings. Thereafter,
"unit participations" in the limited partnerships were offered to the public under condi-
tions which the court found to be rife with fraud and manipulation. In rejecting the
defendant's claim that the limited partnership interests were not securities, the court
relied upon New Jersey's addition to the Uniform Securities Act definition of a "secur-
ity." It added, however, that it was unnecessary to determine whether the interests were
those of "a genuine limited partnership," since such an organization was clearly absent.
80 N.J. Super. at 448, 194 A.2d at 25. Thus, although the statutory definition of "se-
curity" clearly included interests in profit-sharing agreements in real estate projects, it
left open the question of whether a bona fide limited partnership interest could still be
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Since a limited partnership interest will in all likelihood be deemed a
statutory "security," the next inquiry will be whether an exemption will
also be available at the state level. The most probable exemption is that
which excepts transactions where offers are made to fewer than twenty
Indiana persons in a twelve-month period, without commission or re-
muneration, and the purchasers buy for the purpose of investment only.8
Although there is no Indiana case law construing this exemption, it would
seem, on its face, to provide the necessary exemption in all cases where
there are no more than twenty limited partners."88 In addition, the exemp-
tion which excepts isolated non-issuer transactions.8 9 should be con-
sidered, though it would seem to be more difficult to comply with this
provision than the small offering exemption. Also, as was noted in the
discussion of the federal laws, the mere fact that a security may be ex-
empted from registration does not by any means indicate that it is im-
mune from fraud challenge.8 '
CONCLUSION
When investors approach real estate investment, they usually do so
with one of two investment objectives. They may, first of all, seek to
obtain a flow of current income from their investment, or, secondly, they
may need to obtain the fruits of a "tax shelter" to reduce an otherwise
heavy federal income tax burden. Since these objectives are not parallel,
though they are not mutually exclusive, the selection of an organizational
vehicle through which both are sought to be accomplished will require
excluded from the coverage of the statute.
One may also argue that a limited partnership interest is not a security because
"[t]hey do not readily lend themselves to bold and dishonest schemes whereby capital
is raised to carry out a venture by indiscriminate solicitation of the public at large."
Dahlquist, supra note 184, at 363.
Despite these arguments, the position of the SEC that all limited partnership in-
terests are securities compels one to conclude that a much safer, and far more prudent
course is to assume that such interests are securities, and then look for an exemption.
187. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-2(b)(10) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-855(b)(10)
(1970). To help insure compliance with the "investment" requirement of the small of-
fering exemption, the restrictive provisions discussed at notes 172-73 supra & text ac-
companying, should be given consideration.
188. See BLUE SKY LAw, supra note 181, at 368-74.
189. IND. CODE § 23-2-1-2(b) (1) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-855(b) (1) (1970).
See generally BLUE SxY LAw, supra note 181, at 314-23. The availability of this ex-
emption might be indicated by the fact that the definition of an issuer does not include
certificates of interest or participation in oil, gas, or mining titles or leases, IND. CODE §
23-2-1-1(f) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-854(f) (1970), which are interests similar to
those in a limited partnership engaged in real estate investment. In addition, "non-
issuer" is defined to mean "not directly or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer."
IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1(g) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-854(g) (1970).
190. See Note, supra note 180, at 271. The civil and criminal fraud provisions are
contained in IND. CoDE §§ 23-2-1-12, 23-2-1-18, 23-2-1-19 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§
25-866, 25-872, 25-873 (1970).
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considerable care. In most circumstances involving a relatively small
number of investors, the limited partnership will be the preferred form,
and if its structure is properly organized, it will yield the requisite invest-
ment objectives. Such an organizational structure might include the
utilization of a corporation as the general partner, a careful allocation of
profit and loss among the limited partners, and a management contract
executed between the general partner and the partnership. Although it is
suggested that this form will successfully yield the investment objectives
of most real estate investors, the structure does pose several problems from
an organizational point of view. It is these problems that this article has
chiefly sought to analyze.
The limited partnership is, then, a valuable means of accomplishing
the relatively diverse investment objectives of those who pursue real
estate investment. To meet these objectives, however, the organizer may
find it necessary to manipulate its traditional structure. Since many of
the investment objectives will doubtlessly be tax-oriented, any such mani-
pulation may pose a serious hazard to successful compliance with those
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which make the limited part-
nership an attractive organizational form. This hazard is not, however,
insurmountable, and so long as watchful attention is paid to the form re-
quired by the Code, the objectives sought may be successfully reaped.
In implementing any plan to maneuver around or through the Code re-
quirements, though, the form of the limited partnership must be care-
fully kept in mind to insure that the limited liability of the limited partners
is not sacrificed in the effort to obtain the most favorable tax results.
In short, the limited partnership is a valuable organizational vehicle
because it yields the most favorable tax consequences to the small invest-
ment group, and because its form is sufficiently flexible to allow it to meet
the needs of many different kinds of investors. But in utilizing this
flexibility, careful attention must be paid to the permissibility of the vari-
ous nuances sought to be employed, from tax, partnership, corporate or
securities points of view to guarantee that benefits from one standpoint
are not sacrificed for those from another.
